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ABSTRACT
Safety-critical software systems are those whose failure or malfunc-
tion could result in casualty and/or serious financial loss. In such
systems, safety assurance cases (SACs) are an emerging approach
that adopts a proactive strategy to produce structuralized safety jus-
tifications and arguments. While SACs are recommended in many
software-intensive safety-critical domains, the lack of knowledge
regarding the practitioners’ perspectives on using SACs hinders
effective adoption of this approach. To gain such knowledge, we
interviewed nine practitioners and safety experts who focused on
safety-critical software systems. In general, our participants found
the SAC approach beneficial for communication of safety arguments
and management of safety issues in a multidisciplinary setting. The
challenges they faced when using SACs were primarily associated
with (1) a lack of tool support, (2) insufficient process integration,
and (3) scarcity of experienced personnel. To overcome those chal-
lenges, our participants suggested tactics that focused on creating
direct safety arguments. Process and organizational adjustments
are also needed to streamline SAC analysis and creation. Finally,
our participants emphasized the importance of knowledge sharing
about SACs across software-intensive safety-critical domains.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Safety-critical software systems are those whose failure or malfunc-
tion will result in casualty and/or serious financial loss. Assessing
and assuring safety is an important aspect of these kinds of systems.
Over the past two decades, safety assurance cases (SACs) have
emerged as a widely-used technique for safety justification and
argument[3]. In contrast to the traditional prescriptive approach of
safety control and certification, SACs emphasize proactive practices
that rely on system developers taking the initiative and creating
goal-oriented or claim-based safety arguments [7].
SAC arguments are often organized as a tree structure, usually
graphical, that divides a top-level safety goal or claim into layers of
arguments, which are eventually supported by safety evidence such
as test reports or analysis results [2]. With such a structure, SACs
are considered a useful technique to (1) help developers conduct
safety management and (2) support regulatory experts to evaluate
system safety [6, 15]. Several graphic notations were developed to
help organize and represent SACs, including the Claims-Arguments-
Evidence notation [1] and the Goal Structuring Notation [9].
SACs has been recommended in many software-intensive safety-
critical domains. In the US, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) issued guidance that requests infusion pump manufactures
to submit SACs as part of the safety approval process [16]. The Min-
istry of Defense of the UK requires all defense system contractors
to provide SACs for their products and services [15]. Many interna-
tional standards, including ISO26262 for road vehicles, IEC62425
for railway electronic systems, and IAEA SSG-23 for radioactive
waste management systems, also recommended the use of SACs.
Despite, or rather because of the rapid growth, the SAC approach
has suffered from several criticisms. Researchers and practition-
ers have criticized SACs because (1) its lack of guidance in con-
structing effective arguments [14], (2) its tendency to suffer from
confirmation bias [11], (3) its reliance on the regulation culture to
fulfill its value [13], and (4) its inefficacy to capture confidence and
uncertainty issues [5, 6]. More importantly, there is little knowl-
edge regarding the perspectives of safety experts on the benefits,
challenges, and best practices of using SACs. Research in safety-
critical domains is usually system-centered, leaving the practition-
ers’ values and perceptions even less investigated. The lack of this
knowledge considerably diminishes effective adoption of the SAC
approach in the development practice of safety-critical systems.
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In this paper, we aimed to fill this gap by accumulating insights
about the SAC approach from professional practitioners and safety
experts who focused on safety-critical software systems. In par-
ticular, we conducted an empirical study that involved in-depth
interviews with nine participants to identify (1) their perceived
values and benefits of using SACs, (2) the challenges they met asso-
ciated with SAC use, and (3) their insights into best practices and
strategies for overcoming those challenges.
2 METHODS
We recruited our participants through inviting personal contacts
and industrial attendants of software safety conferences and work-
shops.We sent invitation emails to 39 practitioners and six academia
researchers; the academia researchers were contacted because they
have worked closely on industry-centered projects and had ex-
tensive experience creating industrial-grade SACs. Nine agreed to
participate, including two software developers, two safety analysts,
one research engineer, two system assessors from a US federal
certifying agency, and two researchers from a US university. Our
participants covered various software-intensive safety-critical do-
mains including automotive, railway systems, medical devices, and
aviation systems. Participants’ experience in the safety-critical sys-
tems field ranged from six to 25 years. Table 1 summarizes our
participants’ professional experience.
Table 1: Summary of participants’ professional experience.
ID Role & Job Title Years of Experience
P1 Development: Senior software engineer 8
P2 Development: Chief technology officer 25
P3 Analysis: Safety specialist 15
P4 Analysis: Functional safety specialist 25
P5 Research: Safety technology researcher 6
P6 Certifying: Senior systems engineer 23
P7 Certifying: Software engineer 10
P8 Academic Research: Project specialist 17
P9 Academic Research: Scientist 6
We first conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with the
nine participants. During the interviews, we asked the participants
to describe (1) their experience in safety-critical systems and SACs,
(2) their motivation and perceived benefits of using SACs, as well as
(3) the challenges they faced and their mitigating strategies. Each
interview took between 45 and 60 minutes. The interviews were
audio-recorded and later fully transcribed.
Two researchers inductively coded the interviews to identify
prominent themes in participants’ consideration of the benefits,
challenges, and best practices of using SACs. Upon reaching an
agreement, a codebook was created [12]. One other researcher (a
blind coder) then used it to deductively code the interviews [12]. We
calculated inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa through bi-
nary agreement between the codebook creators and the blind coder.
We then refined the codebook by removing the codes that didn’t
achieve a “substantial” inter-rater agreement (i.e. kappa statistic
lower than 0.6 [10]). Among all the themes that remained in our
codebook, the average kappa statistic was .83 (SD = .16).
To further understand the participants’ perceptions, we then
asked them to complete a survey. In the survey, participants rated
their perceived importance of the benefits and challenges we iden-
tified on a five-point Likert scale (from 1-Not at all important to
5-Extremely important) and provided additional comments about
how to overcome those challenges. Following a grounded theory
approach [12], we inductively incorporated those comments in our
codebook to refine our codes. Our interview and survey instruments
are available at: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.5975446.
3 RESULTS
In this section, we describe our results from both the interviews
and the surveys.
3.1 Benefits
When asked about the motivations and benefits of using SACs, our
participants discussed factors that fell into one of the following
four themes. In the following sections, we report those themes and
their average perceived importance (IMP) ratings from the survey.
3.1.1 Communication values. (IMP = 3.86) Seven participants
mentioned that the clear structure of SACs supports communication
of a safety argument among the development team and the safety
assessors. For example, when asked about motivations of requiring
manufactures to provide SACs for certification, a system assessor
(P6) said, “SACs are a good way for manufacturers to communicate
with us and us with them. It’s basically a means of organizing and
presenting your design work to somebody who doesn’t know anything
about it and trying to convince them that it’s safe and effective. ... Also,
[when there is problem] we can be less ambiguous and more focused
on what the problem is. That makes it easier for the manufacturers to
understand what the regulators are looking for as well.”
3.1.2 Frames thinking about system safety. (IMP = 3.86) Three
participants, including both of the software developers, considered
the process of creating and maintaining SACs as an effective frame-
work for the development team to think about system safety in a
more rigorous way. For example, a functional safety analyst (P4)
mentioned, “If you go with more effort and try to document the argu-
ment in SACs, you start realizing all the questions in your mind. You
start realizing, ‘Oh. That’s the assumption. But do we have evidence
that it is true?’ It forces you to be more rigorous in your thinking. ...
All that the SAC did is trying to help you capture your thinking, your
rationale, your understanding.”
3.1.3 Fills the gap for new systems. (IMP = 3.71) Two of our
participants, who were most experienced in SACs, also mentioned
that the goal/claim-oriented SACs support safety argument for new
systems, where safety regulations or guidelines do not yet exist.
An academic researcher (P9) who created many SACs for industrial
collaborators said, “You can’t regulate something that doesn’t exist.
So when the system is new and the product is novel, assurance cases
fill the gap – so that we can try to demonstrate that a new system is
safe for use.”
3.1.4 Easy to engage with. (IMP = 3.14) Four participants stated
that the graphical representation of SACs is easy to understand and
easy to engage with. For example, a system assessor (P7) said, “The
graphs are really easy to understand from a high level. ... It gives you
an overview. You can easily build it in your brain.” A safety analyst
(P4) also commented on straightforward notation of SACs: “It’s not
too complicated. Especially with the Goal Structuring Notation, it isn’t
really got half a of dozen symbols. So it’s quite easy to understand.”
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Figure 1: Average perceived importance of the challenges in
using SACs. Error bars show the standard deviations.
3.2 Challenges
During the interviews, our participants described various factors
that resulted in challenges of using SACs that we categorized into
seven types. The survey results revealed that while varied, par-
ticipants considered all of these types of challenges as at least
moderately important; all average ratings are above three (see Fig.
1). In the following sections, we describe these challenges in the
descending order of average importance as rated by the participants.
3.2.1 Scalability. The most significant challenge from our par-
ticipants’ perspective is that of navigating and comprehending
large SACs, especially when presented using graphical form. Our
participants mentioned that this issue is exacerbated by the lim-
ited tool support for creating, maintaining, and reviewing SACs.
While there are a few dedicated commercial SAC tools such as
Adelard’s ASCE (www.adelard.com/asce) and GessNet’s TurboAC
(www.gessnet.com), current tools either fail to deliver features for
effectively handling scalability or are focused on a narrow domain
with limited adoption.
3.2.2 Managing change. Changes in software, especially in soft-
ware requirements, can result in changes in SACs. But there is
currently no effective mechanisms to manage those changes. Our
participants mentioned that this is particularly challenging because
the SAC creation and maintenance has not been fully integrated
into the software development process. The lack of tool support
also contributed to this challenge.
3.2.3 Requiring special skills to create. The graphic notations of
SACs are usually easy to understand. However, our participants con-
sidered that creating a convincing, well structured safety argument
requires special skills and considerable experience. Participants
also mentioned that because of sensitivity of many safety-critical
domains, there is limited knowledge sharing about practical SAC
strategies and real-world SAC examples, making acquiring those
skills even more difficult.
3.2.4 Complexity of the system. Our participants mentioned
that since most safety-critical systems are innately complex and
many systems are interconnected, capturing the safety concerns
in those systems becomes increasingly challenging. In addition,
because developing safety-critical systems often involves experts
in various disciplines, multidisciplinary collaboration in arguing
system safety is also important and challenging.
3.2.5 Uncertainty, trust, confidence. When considering the effi-
cacy of SACs, many participants voiced concerns about the fact that
system safety always involves issues related to uncertainty, trust,
and confidence. Capturing these “intangible” issues and establish-
ing trust and confidence in the safety arguments was considered as
a challenge.
3.2.6 Too "flexible". SACs rely on system manufacturers to cre-
ate safety justifications and arguments.While this mechanism offers
flexibility, some of our participants mentioned that it is dangerous
if manufacturers overlook or omit certain safety aspects. In other
words, the SAC technique may be subject to confirmation bias
and/or conflicts of interest of the manufacturers. Related to the
challenge of establishing trust and confidence, participants consid-
ered addressing these limitations of SACs challenging.
3.2.7 Incomplete information. Related to the limited integration
of SAC management in the software development process, our par-
ticipants discussed the challenges involved in gathering sufficient
and accurate information for safety arguments. This issue primar-
ily originated from flawed safety requirements, insufficient test
coverage, and incomplete traceability across software artifacts.
3.3 Best Practices
During the interviews and in the survey responses, our participants
provided useful insights into strategies addressing the challenges of
using SACs. While a few targeted a specific challenge, most of those
strategies were considered as general best practices for creating
and maintaining good safety arguments using SACs.
3.3.1 Start early and update often. Seven of our participants
mentioned that it is best to start creating the initial SAC early in
the software development process and let the SAC evolve with
other software artifacts. This usually leverages and also reinforces
software traceability. For example, a safety analyst (P3) discussed
his successful experience of creating a SAC for an aerospace system,
saying, “We started [building the SAC] from the concept phase down
to the specification phase, the architecture and so on. And we tried to
trace everything that comes from the concept and specifications down
to at least the test case, and the test report.” An academic researcher
(P8) considered that updating SACs along with system develop-
ment is the key to fully realizing the benefits of SACs: “Essentially
constructing the safety case should drive design choices and decisions
that support system safety”.
3.3.2 Strengthen analysis process. Seven participants also sug-
gested that practitioners should strengthen their safety analysis
process by involving multiple stakeholders, including external re-
viewers, and strive for comprehensiveness of safety requirements.
For example, a developer (P1) considered that to “have a diverse
team, especially with people who are not software developers, discuss
the SAC and come to an agreement” is important to raise the team’s
confidence on the safety justification and argument.
3.3.3 Focus on direct and well-structured argument. Six partic-
ipants discussed the importance of focusing on creating direct,
defensible, and clearly divided arguments, supported by relevant
and up-to-date evidence. For example, when asked about sugges-
tions of creating a good SAC, a safety assessor (P7) said, “If you
think about claim, argument and evidence, I want to see those three
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things come together. The structure of the claims should be very log-
ically divided. ... And you need a defensible argument and tailored
evidence.” A software developer (P2) also discussed his strategy
to “orthogonaly” divide and conquer safety concerns in order to
achieve a well-structured argument.
3.3.4 Augment graphs with text and tables. The graphic repre-
sentation could support the comprehensibility of SACs. However,
it is still important to combine the graphs with text and tables to
augment the argument. Five of our participants discussed this is-
sue. For example, a safety analyst (P4) said, “I tend to use the Goal
Structuring Notation in small amounts. And then put it in the context
of text and tables. So you tend to have text to talk about stuff and
then say, ’Okay. This is an overall argument. And here is a diagram.’
... So later when I read the texts and the tables, I got a context from
the standing in the diagram – sort of why they are there and what
they are supposed to be justifying.”
3.3.5 Seek for tool support. While many available SAC tools
have limitations, six participants mentioned that it is still worth
seeking tool support to address scalability issues and change impact
analysis in SACs. Three participants have used internally developed
tools to create and manage SACs. The two safety assessors also
mentioned that they found that manufactures started to submit
SACs developed using commercial tools; SACs submitted with tools
usually eased their reviewing process. We believe the availability
and maturity of SAC tools will go hand in hand with the adoption
of the SAC technique.
3.3.6 Promote knowledge sharing. Four of our participants dis-
cussed the importance for practitioners and researchers in the safety
community to promote knowledge sharing about SACs by publish-
ing successful real-world examples and developing standards, pat-
terns and guidelines. Particularly, a safety analyst (P4) mentioned
he benefited a lot from using SAC patterns [4, 8]. An academic
researcher (P8) also expressed his hope to see wider adoption and
more knowledge sharing: “Part of the issue is that the area itself is
not well-developed and the techniques are not widely-practiced. As
more system engineers and safety engineers develop safety-cases and
share best practices, the problems would get addressed.”
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we investigated the perspectives of practitioners and
safety experts on using SACs in safety-critical domains. In general,
our participants found the SAC approach beneficial for communi-
cating safety arguments and managing safety issues. Particularly, a
general theme of those benefits lies on the SACs’ ability to bridge the
expertise and work-flows of software developers, safety analysts,
and product certification experts. In other words, our participants
considered SACs to be a useful tool for supporting collaboration of
experts from different areas to enhance system safety.
However, because the SAC is still an emerging technique, our
participants faced various challenges when using SACs. Our study
revealed that those challenges were mostly associated with (1) the
lack of tool support (to address scalability issues and support change
management), (2) insufficient process integration (so that change
management tended to be ad hoc and gathering accurate safety
information was difficult), and (3) scarcity of experienced personnel
(to reliably capture safety-related issues in complex systems).
Our participants collectively offered best practices and strategies
to overcome those challenges, which can be seen on three differ-
ent levels. First, on a tactical level, focusing on creating a direct
argument structure and augmenting the graphical representation
would help create cogent and effective SACs. Second, on a process
and organizational level, integrating the SAC approach early in the
development process and creating a culture of involving diverse
experts in safety analysis would strengthen safety justification. In
fact, this is a strategy repeatedly discussed in the safety literature
(e.g. [2, 14, 15]) but rarely practiced in the real world. Finally, effec-
tive adoption of SACs requires community efforts to promote tool
support and knowledge sharing. With more organizations realizing
the value of this technique and more regulatory bodies requiring
SACs, we expect to see an accelerated growth of work in this area.
This paper is one of the first to capture the perspectives of practi-
tioners and safety experts on the use of SACs. We were only able to
work with nine participants. However, they covered a wide range
of safety-critical domains and included experts with different roles
associated with the use of the SAC approach. From this diverse
body of participants, we aimed to identify common elements in
their perceptions and opinions. We argue that these common ele-
ments captured representative issues of SAC use and served as a
much-needed first step towards knowledge sharing in this area.
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